EDUCATION, KILL CHAIN, THEAT MODELING

⚔️ Cyber Kill Chain Guide - Anatomy of Attack

Seven chapters on modelling of attacks in international practice: Lockheed Martin Kill Chain (Hutchins, Cloppert, Amin 2011), MITRE ATT&CK 14 tactics, Unified Kill Chain (Paul Pauls), Diamond Model, D3FEND defense matrix, traces in Windows, macOS and Linux magazines and related to reporting of Article 23 of the NIS2 incidents. Examples are fictional, designed for training.

Basis for attack modelling

Kill Chain principle - breaking one stage, mission fails

Lockheed Martin Cyber Kill Chain - Hutchins, Cloppert, Amin (2011)

  1. 1. IntelligenceReconnaissanceOSINT, scanning
  2. 2. ArmamentWeaponizationexploit + payload
  3. 3. DeliveryDeliveryphishing, USB, web
  4. 4. OperationExploitationvulnerability or user click
  5. 5. InstallationInstallationbackdoor, durability
  6. 6. Management (C2)Command & Controlremote control
  7. 7. ObjectivesActions on Objectivesdata export, encryption

The defender can interrupt the chain at any stage. Six Actions of Action: To detect, deny, dismantle, trouble, deceive, destroy. The earlier the chain is interrupted, the less damage. The attacker must succeed in all seven phases, the defender must stop one.

History

The Cyber Kill Chain model was formalized in 2011 by Lockheed Martin researchers Hutchins, Cloppert and Amin. Model adapted from military 'F2T2EA' kit chain (Find, Fix, Track, Target, Engage, Assess) in the US Air Force.

Basic principle

The attack is a sequential chain - every next phase needs a previous result. By stopping one stage, the whole attack fails. This means that the defenders do not have to be perfect in all phases - it is enough to break one.

In practice

Three modeling, threat intelligence (TI), detection engineering, incident response plans, security gap analysis, purple team simulations.

Restrictions

Model created for APT/network intrusion analysis. Less suited for internal threats, supply chain attacks, cloud-native attacks and compromised SaaS sessions where 'supply' and 'operation' are foggy.

Lockheed Martin 7 Phases

From intelligence to objectives - each phase with protection

Seven Phases - What an attacker does and what a defender can do
PhaseAttackerDefender
1. IntelligenceReconnaissanceAttacker
  • DNA identification, port scan (nmap)
  • OSINT (LinkedIn, GitHub), e-mail collection, employee profiles
Defender
  • Attack Surface Recording (ASM), Domain Monitoring
  • Web log analysis, honeypot, threat intelligence
2. ArmamentWeaponizationAttacker
  • Exploit and payload linkage (e.g. Metaspluit, Cobalt Strike)
  • Abuse PDF, Office macro, compromised driver
Defender
  • Directly influenced by not - taking place on the attacker's side
  • Threatening about toolkits, IoC lists
3. DeliveryDeliveryAttacker
  • Pishing emails and attachments, chatering cole
  • USB, malvertising, drive-by downloads
Defender
  • E-mail filters (SPF, DKIM, DMARC), attachment sandbox
  • Web proxy, URL reputation, USB control
4. OperationExploitationAttacker
  • Injurability in application, OS or browser (CVE)
  • Social engineering - user turns on macro or installs himself
Defender
  • Patch by priority (KEV catalogue), DEP/ASLR, sandbox
  • EDR, training, MFA against password phishing
5. InstallationInstallationAttacker
  • Backdoor, RAT, web shell, planned task, registry Run keys
  • Persistence: automatic launch, services, WMI subscriptions
Defender
  • EDR with behavioural analysis, list of apps permitted
  • File integrity monitoring (FIM), author's audit
6. Management (C2)Command & ControlAttacker
  • Regular communication with C2 server (HTTP/S, DNS tunnel, cloud services)
  • The attacker controls the computer remotely
Defender
  • Filtering of outgoing traffic, DNA analysis (DGA), TLS test
  • NIDS/NDR, IoC blocking, JA3/JA4prints
7. ObjectivesActions on ObjectivesAttacker
  • Data export, encryption, destruction
  • Raising rights, moving to other systems
Defender
  • DLP, data classification, storage encryption
  • Network segmentation, fixed copies, incident plan

A step-by-step attack - and where it can be stopped

Seven phases in one example. The Green Statement shows what the defender can do precisely in this step.

Attack with phishing email

  1. 1
    Attacker1. Intelligence: collects employees' names and emails from the site and LinkedIn

    The attacker does not send anything yet - he learns about an organization from public sources.

  2. 2
    Attacker2. Gun preparation: document with malware macro

    Prepare an attachment that will trigger the code when opening.

  3. 3
    Attacker → Organisation3. Delivery: e-mail'Invoice.docm '

    Defender can: e-mail filter, SPF/DKIM/DMARC, employee recognizes and reports

    This is the first time an attacker touches the organization - and the first chance to break the chain.

  4. 4
    Organisation4. Use: employee opens attachment, macro starts

    Defender: macro from the Internet banned, EDR stops suspicious process.

  5. 5
    Organisation5. Install: malware set to start after restart

    Defender: Application control, automatic starting point monitoring.

  6. 6
    Organisation → Attacker6. Management (C2): the computer communicates with the attacker's server

    Defender can: DNS filter, output traffic restriction, network monitoring (NDR)

    The infected computer itself calls the attacker - therefore, the limited outgoing traffic is a powerful protection.

  7. 7
    Attacker → Organisation7. Achievement of objectives: data collection, export or encryption

    Defender can: segmentation, DLP, offline copies

    If the chain is not interrupted earlier, here are the biggest losses.

  8. 8
    NoteThe earlier the chain is interrupted, the less damage.

    The attacker must succeed in every step, the defender must stop one.

Typical commands in each phase

The attacker lines are for recognition and authorised testing, with no ready-made payloads. Use only on your own systems or with written permission.

1. Reconnaissance

  • whois <domēns>; dig +noall +answer <domēns> MX
    Attacker: registration data and mail servers.
  • nmap -sV -Pn <mērķis>
    Attacker: open ports and versions.
  • awk '{print $1}' access.log | sort | uniq -c | sort -rn | head
    Defender: addresses with the most requests.

2. Weaponization

  • sha256sum <fails>; file <fails>
    Defender: file identity and real type. Weaponization itself happens on the attacker's side and is not in your logs.
  • olevba <dokuments.docm>
    Defender: macros in a document (oletools).
  • yara -r noteikumi.yar <mape>
    Defender: searches files for known indicators.

3. Delivery

  • GoPhish Application for authorised phishing training in an organisation.
  • grep -iE '^(received|authentication-results|return-path):' vestule.eml
    Defender: the message route and SPF, DKIM, DMARC results.
  • curl -sIL <saite>
    Defender: where a link leads without opening it in a browser.

4. Exploitation

  • nuclei -u https://<savs-mērķis> -severity critical,high
    Authorised test: known vulnerabilities on your own system.
  • journalctl -p err --since '1 hour ago'
    Defender: service errors around the time of the attack.
  • Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='System';Id=7031,7034}
    Defender on Windows: services that stopped unexpectedly.

5. Installation

  • systemctl list-unit-files --state=enabled; crontab -l
    Defender on Linux: what starts automatically.
  • Get-ScheduledTask | Where-Object State -ne Disabled
    Defender on Windows: active scheduled tasks.
  • find /etc /usr/local /tmp -type f -mtime -2
    Defender: recently changed files.

6. Command and control

  • ss -tunap state established
    Defender on Linux: active connections and processes.
  • Get-NetTCPConnection -State Established | Select-Object RemoteAddress,RemotePort,OwningProcess
    Defender on Windows: the same.
  • sudo tcpdump -nn -i any 'port 53' -c 100
    Defender: unusual DNS volume can be a control channel.

7. Actions on objectives

  • whoami /all; net group 'Domain Admins' /domain
    Attacker on Windows: typical discovery after a break-in. Look for this pattern in logs.
  • rclone copy <mape> <attālināta-krātuve>:
    Attacker: a common data exfiltration tool. Unexpected rclone on a server is an indicator.
  • ausearch -k <atslēga> -ts recent
    Defender: auditd records of sensitive file use.
  • Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='Security';Id=4663} -MaxEvents 50
    Defender on Windows: access to audited objects.

In practice

This table serves as a detection engineering 'card' - each phase needs to know what artifact or signal indicates how it is going, so that SOC can establish the appropriate rule.

Reference

Lockheed Martin "Cyber Kill Chain' (2011), Hutchins, Cloppert, Amin - "Intelligence-Driven Computer Network Defense Informed by Analysis of Additional Campaigns and Intrusion Kill Chains'.

Lacmus test

Can your SOC reveal at least one artifact in each of the seven phases? If any phase is 'empty' - there's a blind strip that an attacker can use without respect.

MITRE ATT&CK - tactics, techniques, procedures

14 tactics - detailed fascinating behavior classification

MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise - 14 tactics in matrix order, each with three examples of techniques

  1. TA0043IntelligenceReconnaissanceKill Chain Phase: 1
    • Active Scanning
    • Gather Victim Identity Information
    • Search Open Websites/Domains
  2. TA0042Resource PreparationResource DevelopmentKill Chain Phase: 2
    • Acquire Infrastructure
    • Compromise Accounts
    • Develop Capabilities
  3. TA0001Initial accessInitial AccessKill Chain Phase: 3
    • Phishing
    • Drive-by Compromise
    • Valid Accounts
  4. TA0002EnforcementExecutionKill Chain Phase: 4
    • Command and Scripting Interpreter
    • User Execution
    • Scheduled Task/Job
  5. TA0003StabilityPersistenceKill Chain Phase: 5
    • Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
    • Create Account
    • Scheduled Task/Job
  6. TA0004EnforcementPrivilege EscalationKill Chain phase: 4-7
    • Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
    • Access Token Manipulation
    • Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
  7. TA0005Circulation of protectionDefense EvasionKill Chain phase: 4-7
    • Obfuscated Files or Information
    • Indicator Removal
    • Impair Defenses
  8. TA0006Obtaining access dataCredential AccessKill Chain Phase: 7
    • Brute Force
    • OS Credential Dumping
    • Steal Web Session Cookie
  9. TA0007Environmental researchDiscoveryKill Chain Phase: 7
    • Account Discovery
    • Network Service Discovery
    • Process Discovery
  10. TA0008NetworkingLateral MovementKill Chain Phase: 7
    • Remote Services
    • Internal Spearphishing
    • Lateral Tool Transfer
  11. TA0009Data collectionCollectionKill Chain Phase: 7
    • Email Collection
    • Data from Local System
    • Screen Capture
  12. TA0011Management (C2)Command and ControlKill Chain Phase: 6
    • Application Layer Protocol
    • Encrypted Channel
    • Ingress Tool Transfer
  13. TA0010Data removalExfiltrationKill Chain Phase: 7
    • Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
    • Exfiltration Over Web Service
    • Scheduled Transfer
  14. TA0040ImpactImpactKill Chain Phase: 7
    • Data Encrypted for Impact
    • Data Destruction
    • Service Stop

Kill Chain phase is approximate conformity. ATT&CK's tactics are not consecutive: they are repeated by the attacker and are bypassing protection throughout the attack, so the increase of rights and the circumvention of protection are consistent with several phases.

From abstract to specific

  1. 1. Tactics - WhyTacticattacker's goal in this step, 14 tactics
  2. 2. Technical - asTechniquegeneral type, around 200 techniques
  3. 3. Sub-equipmentSub-techniquemore specific option, more than 400
  4. 4. ProcedureProcedurewhat a particular group did

Example: TA0002 Execution → T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter → T1059.001 PowerShell → team specific.

Difference from LM

The LM Kill Chain has a linear chain (after → how). ATT&CK is a granular tactical catalogue (which → as → specifically). The attacker can stop, return, repeat phases - so 14 tactics are not necessarily consecutive.

Reference

MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise (attack.mitre.org). Established in 2013, publicly available since 2015, new versions are released approximately twice a year.

Practical use

ATT&CK Navigator - map which techniques your SOC covers with detection. Empty cells = blind strips. Purple team simulates procedures to verify detection.

Volume trap

Covering all ~400 sub-technics is a marathon work. Start from APT groups that target your sector (e.g. FIN7 for finance, Lazarus for energy) rather than all at once.

Unified Kill Chain - Paul Paul (2017)

3 phases of 18 phases - merging LM + ATT&CK

Unified Kill Chain - Paul Paul (2017, updated 2022)

A. Initial access In - Initial Foothold

The attacker gets the first stop.

  1. 1. IntelligenceReconnaissanceOSINT, scanning
  2. 2. Resource PreparationResource Developmentinfrastructure, tools
  3. 3. DeliveryDeliveryphishing, USB
  4. 4. Social engineeringSocial Engineeringmanipulation
  5. 5. OperationExploitationvulnerability, macro
  6. 6. StabilityPersistenceautomatic startup
  7. 7. Circulation of protectionDefense Evasionskiing
  8. 8. Management (C2)Command & Controlcontact with the attacker

B. Networking Through - Network Propagation

The attacker extends access and moves towards the target.

  1. 9. ConversionPivotingproxy, tunnel
  2. 10. Environmental researchDiscoveryAD, Network Card
  3. 11. EnforcementPrivilege EscalationUAC, sudo, token
  4. 12. EnforcementExecutionPowerShell, WMI
  5. 13. Obtaining access dataCredential AccessLASS, password mixing values
  6. 14. NetworkingLateral MovementRDP, SMB

C. Achievement of objectives Out - Action on Objectives

The attacker reaches why came: data, extortion or sabotage.

  1. 15. Data collectionCollectionpreparation, compression
  2. 16. Data removalExfiltrationcloud, DNA, e-mail
  3. 17. ImpactImpactencryption, destruction, DoS
  4. 18. Achievement of objectivesObjectivesstrategic result

The stages are repeated: after each movement in the network, the attacker often starts again with research and empowerment.

Why 18 phases?

LM 7 phases are too simplified for a modern attack - especially 'after access' activities. UKC divides them into stage B and clearly separates social engineering as a separate phase.

Reference

Paul Pauls - Unified Kill Chain (Master's Work, Cyber Security Academy, 2017; updated version 2022), unifiedkillchain.com.

In practice

For analysis of modern APT/ransomware operations - where the attacker returns several times between stages A and B (e.g. executes the 2.3, 4. intelligence iteration after each lateral movement).

Complexity

18 phases are more difficult to communicate to management than LM 7 phases. UKC is better suited for technical analysis, LM for presentations and risk communication.

Protection strategy

Courses of Action matrix + Diamond Model + MITRE D3FEND

Courses of Action (CoA) - six actions in each of the seven phases (Hutchins, Cloppert, Amin 2011)

Defending actions in each phase of Kill Chain
PhaseDiscoverDetectDenyDenyDisruptDisruptBurdenDegradeDecideDeceiveDestroyDestroy
1. IntelligenceReconnaissanceDiscoverWeb Log Analysis, HoneypotDenyLess public informationDisruptRequest limits, CAPTCHABurdenTarpit - a slow answer to the scannerDecideFalse DNA recordings, mammalportsDestroyNot legally allowed
2. ArmamentWeaponizationDiscoverYARA rules, threat intelligenceDenyoutside the defender's networkDisruptoutside the defender's networkBurdenoutside the defender's networkDecideHoneyfiles, canary tokensDestroyoutside the defender's network
3. DeliveryDeliveryDiscoverAttachment sandbox, URL reputationDenySPF/DKIM/DMRAC, USB banDisruptVerification of annexes before deliveryBurdenGreylisting, shipment limitationDecideMunicipal Email AccountsDestroyAbuse URL removal with CSIRT
4. OperationExploitationDiscoverEDR signals for operationDenyPatches, DEP/ASLR, sandboxDisruptExploit Guard, EDR blocksBurdenSandbox Resource LimitsDecideMental servicesDestroyDelete File, Change Passwords
5. InstallationInstallationDiscoverFIM, author supervisionDenyList of applications authorised, code signatureDisruptQuarantine, EDR roll-outBurdenRight to enforce only temporarily (JIT)DecideMotherbackdoor, fake registerDestroyReinstall from a pure image
6. Management (C2)Command & ControlDiscoverDNA and DGA analysis, NID, JA3/JA4DenyOutgoing traffic filtering, IoC blockingDisruptDNA Syncole, Proxy BlockBurdenZone width limitsDecideC2 channelling to honeynetDestroyC2 single with law enforcement
7. ObjectivesActions on ObjectivesDiscoverDLP, Behavioural Analysis (UEBA)DenyDLP blocking, segmentationDisruptNetwork isolation of computerBurdenLimit on the amount of data to be exportedDecideMental files, data trapsDestroyNetwork cut-off, renewal

Diamond Model of Intrusion Analysis - Caltagirone, Pendergast, Betz (2013)

Each incident is described by four corners. Finding one can find the others.

Diamond Model - opponent, abilities, victim, infrastructure OpponentAdditional Capacitytools, TTP SacrificeVictim InfrastructureC2, IP, domains

Finding one corner:

  • the victim reaches the capacity used;
  • from capability to infrastructure;
  • from infrastructure to other victims;
  • all together allow the detection of the opponent (the award).

MITRE D3FEND 1.0 - protective tactics:

  • modelling and strengthening (Model, Harden);
  • detect and isolate (Detect, Isolate);
  • deceive;
  • expel and restore (Evict, Restore).

Courses of Action

6 types of action have no choice - an advocacy strategy ideally covers several stages so that the attacker has several potentially cut-off points.

Diamond Model

Threat intel analysis framework - each incident as a 4-hour ratio. When discovering one corner, you can find the rest. Perfect for tracking campaigns.

D3FEND

MITRE D3FEND (2021) - catalogue of defence activities according to ATT&CK techniques. D3fend.mitre.org - shows for each ATT&CK technique which D3FEND operations neutralise it.

Legal notice

In the 'Destroy' phase carefully - 'hack back' (attack back) is mostly illegal. Allowed: takeown with law enforcement, C2 synkhole, cooperation with CSIRT.

Detection of Windows, macOS and Linux

What the attacker leaves in the system and how to see it

An attack from the supply phase leaves traces in the host: entries in the magazine, new service, planned task. These are places where the chain can be seen and interrupted. The hardness (to be ruled out above) is surface guide.

Kill Chain Phases and their feet in the host Delivery, operation, installation, management and purpose leave traces in log, service, planned tasks and network. The MITRE ATT&CK technique corresponds to each foot. 3 Delivery e-mail, download 4 Operation new process 5 Installation system stability 6 Management (C2) external connection 7 Objectives data, foot hiding Log application, new process (4624, 4688) Service 7045 Task 4698 Network new external connection Log Deleted 1102 T1566, T1059 T1543 T1053 T1071 T1070

The bottom row is where to watch - commands below. Figures are Windows event IDs, codes - MITRE ATT&CK techniques.

1. Logs - see and follow in real time

Windows

Recent safety events:

Get-WinEvent -LogName Security -MaxEvents 20 |
  Format-Table TimeCreated, Id -AutoSize

Follow in real time (new every 5 s):

$since = Get-Date
while ($true) {
  Start-Sleep 5; $now = Get-Date
  Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{
    LogName='Security'; StartTime=$since
  } -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |
    Format-Table TimeCreated, Id -AutoSize
  $since = $now
}

Key IDs: 4624/4625 login, 4688 new process (to be turned on in audit policy), 4697 and 7045 new service, 4698 planned task, 1102 magazine deleted.

macOS

Last hour, failed actions:

log show --last 1h --style compact \
  --predicate 'eventMessage CONTAINS[c] "fail"'

Follow in real time (e.g. SSH):

log stream --style compact \
  --predicate 'process == "sshd"'

Linux

Last hour warnings:

journalctl --since "1 hour ago" -p warning

Follow in real time:

journalctl -f
sudo tail -F /var/log/auth.log   # Debian/Ubuntu
sudo tail -F /var/log/secure     # RHEL/Fedora

2. Services - Find new and stop

Windows

Operating services and recently installed:

Get-Service | Where-Object Status -eq Running
Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{
  LogName='System'; Id=7045 } -MaxEvents 10

Stop and disable

Stop-Service <serviss>
Set-Service <serviss> -StartupType Disabled

Revert

Set-Service <serviss> -StartupType Manual
Start-Service <serviss>

macOS

Loaded and third party launchd entries:

launchctl list | grep -v com.apple
ls /Library/LaunchDaemons /Library/LaunchAgents \
   ~/Library/LaunchAgents

Stop and disable

sudo launchctl bootout system \
  /Library/LaunchDaemons/<label>.plist
sudo launchctl disable system/<label>

Revert

sudo launchctl enable system/<label>
sudo launchctl bootstrap system \
  /Library/LaunchDaemons/<label>.plist

Linux

Operating and on-board services:

systemctl list-units --type=service --state=running
systemctl list-unit-files --state=enabled

Stop and disable

sudo systemctl disable --now <serviss>

Revert

sudo systemctl enable --now <serviss>

3. Planned tasks - review and set your own

Windows

Active tasks (the attacker hides resilience right here):

Get-ScheduledTask | Where-Object State -ne Disabled |
  Select-Object TaskPath, TaskName, State

Set Daily Check

$a = New-ScheduledTaskAction -Execute powershell.exe `
  -Argument '-NoProfile -File C:\Scripts\check.ps1'
$t = New-ScheduledTaskTrigger -Daily -At 06:00
Register-ScheduledTask -TaskName DailyCheck `
  -Action $a -Trigger $t -User 'NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM'

Delete

Unregister-ScheduledTask -TaskName DailyCheck -Confirm:$false

macOS

User cron and third party launchd:

crontab -l
launchctl list | grep -v com.apple

Set Daily Check

(crontab -l 2>/dev/null
 echo '0 6 * * * /usr/local/bin/check.sh') | crontab -

Delete

crontab -l | grep -v /usr/local/bin/check.sh | crontab -

Linux

Timers and cron:

systemctl list-timers --all
crontab -l; ls /etc/cron.d /etc/cron.daily

Set Daily Check

sudo systemd-run --unit=daily-check \
  --on-calendar='*-*-* 06:00:00' /usr/local/bin/check.sh

Delete

sudo systemctl stop daily-check.timer

NIST SP 800-92

Log Management: what to collect, how long to store, how to protect against deletion.

CIS Controls v8.1 - 8

Audit log management: centralised collection, time synchronization, regular review.

MITRE ATT&CK

T1543 service, T1053 planned task, T1070 foot quench - permanent and skiing techniques that are seen right here.

In practice

Logs should be sent to a central system (SIEM) - an attacker with administrator rights can delete the local log.

Article 23 NIS2 and national legislation

Incident reporting - 24 h / 72 h / 1 month after notification

Article 23 of Directive (EU) 2022/2555, transposed by each Member State into national law. Time limits shall count from the moment the entity becomes aware of a significant incident.

  1. 24 h Early warningEarly Warning, 23(4)(a)suspected abuse and cross-border effects
  2. 72 hours Incident notificationIncident Notification, 23(4)(b)initial assessment: severity, effect, IoC, if any
  3. on request Intermediate reportIntermediate Report, 23(4)(c)if the CSIRTs or the supervisory authority so requests
  4. 1 month Final reportFinal Report, 23(4)(d)within one month of notification: cause, measures, impact

If the incident is still ongoing within the deadline of the final report, a progress report and a final report shall be submitted within one month of the end of the incident.

Supervision - Competent authorities

Monitors relevant and important entities, may issue orders and impose penalties, check self-assessments and audits, cooperate with ENISA and other national authorities.

CSIRTs - Incident Prevention

Member State Command: Receives messages, assists in response, disseminates IoC and alerts, coordinates the detection of vulnerabilities.

Who should report?

The report shall be received by the CSIRT or by the competent authority in accordance with national law. Which institution and to which supervisory authority to report may also depend on the sector of the entity - a check before, not during, the incident.

Reference

Article 23 of Directive (EU) 2022/2555 and its transposing national legislation.

Practical link with Kill Chain

An important incident is defined by the impact, not by the phase: serious disruption of the service, financial loss or damage to others (Article 23 (3)). The deadline starts when you learn about an incident - the earlier you notice it in the chain, the more time you react.

Penalties

NIS2 provides penalties of up to 10 million euros or 2% of the annual turnover in the world for significant entities and up to 7 million euros or 1.4% for important entities. Non-communication itself is an offence - even if an incident was caused by a failure, not an attack.

Abbreviations

Abbreviations used in the Roadmap: the original name and what it means.

APT
Advanced Persistent Threat - a well-funded group that long and targeted attacks one organization.
TTP
Tactics, Techniques and Procedures - the course of action of the attacker.
MITRE ATT&CK
An attacker tactics (TA00xx) and a technical knowledge base.
UKC
Unified Kill Chain - Pola Pulsa model, which combines Kill Chain and ATT&CK in 18 phases.
CoA
Courses of Action - types of actions of the defender: detect, deny, interfere, weaken, deceive, destroy.
F2T2EA
Find, Fix, Track, Target, Engage, Assess - the military target chain model from which Kill Chain originated.
D3FEND
MITRE knowledge base for defence techniques - ATT&CK opposite.
OSINT
Open-Source Intelligence - collecting information from public sources.
IoC
Indicator of Compromise - a sign that the system was cracked.
C2
Command and Control - the control channel of the attacker to an infected computer.
RAT
Remote Access Trojan - malware that gives the attacker remote access.
DGA
Domain Generation Algorithm - malware creates new domains every day to make it harder to block.
LSASS
Local Security Authority Subsystem Service - Windows process, memory of which is login data - often target of attack.
UAC
User Account Control - Windows approval window for enhanced rights.
WMI
Windows Management Instrumentation - Windows management interface, which is also used by attackers.
SMB
Server Message Block - Windows file sharing protocol.
ASLR / DEP
Address Space Layout Randomization / Data Execution Prevention - memory protection which makes it difficult to use vulnerabilities.
SPF / DKIM / DMARC
Checks on the sender of e-mails which make it difficult for counterfeit e-mails.
EDR / NDR
Endpoint / Network Detection and Response - monitoring and responding to computers/networks.
NIDS
Network Intrusion Detection System - discovery of intrusion into the network stream.
UEBA
User and Entity Behavior Analytics - detection of behavioural abnormalities.
FIM
File Integrity Monitoring - warns if important files change.
SIEM
Security Information and Event Management - central analysis of magazines.
YARA
Rule language for the recognition of malware in files.
JA3 / JA4
TLS connection imprint for recognising tool or malware.
KEV
Known Exploited Vulnerabilities - CISA catalog with already used injuries.
CVE
Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures - vulnerability identifier (CVE-year-number).
CSIRT
Computer Security Incident Response Team - incident response team.
ASM
Attack Surface Management - a permanent inventory of their systems on the internet.
JIT
Just-In-Time - right to a short period of time only.